State of Maharashtra v Vijay Waman Patil and Others

Bombay High Court

9 July 2009

Cr.A. No. 294 of 1996 With Cr.A. No. 375 of 1996 With Cr.A. No. 339 of 1996 With Cr.A. No. 370 of 1996 With Cr.A. No. 472 of 1996 With Cr.A. No. 424 of 1996 With Cr.A. No. 413 of 1996 With Cr.A. No. 561 of 1996 With Cr.A. No. 583 of 1996 With Cr.A. No. 627 of 1996 With Cr.A. No. 724 of 1996

The Judgment was delivered by : HON’BLE JUSTICE S. C. DHARMADHIKARI

These matters have been placed before us upon reference made on 17th February 2009 by Hon’ble Mr.Justice A.S.Oka. In Criminal Appeal No.294 of 1996, the following question of law is referred to the Division Bench:-

“Whether the amendment to sub-s. 1 of S. 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 made by the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 2005 will apply to the pending appeals against acquittal/applications for leave filed by the State prior to 23rd June 2006 for challenging orders of acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of cognisable and non bailable offences?”

It is stated that reference was necessitated because there are conflicting views expressed by Single Judges of this Court on the applicability of Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as Amended Act). This amended act came into force on 23rd June 2006. The divergence of opinion is as to whether Amended Act will apply to appeals which are filed and pending prior to 23rd June 2006. A learned Single Judge of this Court in State of Maharashtra Vs. H.P. Waidande & Ors, in Cri. Application No.2937 of 2006 decided on 17th November 2006 (2007 All M.R. (Cri) 41) took a view that the amendment Act will not apply to appeals filed prior to this date and another learned Judge took a view that the Amendment Act will apply to appeals against acquittal which are filed on or prior to 23rd June 2006. To resolve this conflict, the above question has been referred to a Larger Bench and that is how this reference is placed before us.

Before proceeding further, it would be advantageous to refer to the provisions for filing an appeal against Acquittal. Prior to the Amendment Act being brought into force, S. 378 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 read as under:-

“378(1) Appeal in case of Acquittal : (1) Save as otherwise provided in sub-s. (2) and subject to the provisions of sub-s. (3) and (5), the State Government may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court (or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of Sessions in revision.

(2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under theDelhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946) or by any other agency empowered to make investigation into an office under any Central Act other than this Code, the Central Government may also direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), to the High Court from the order of acquittal.

(3) No appeal under sub-s. (1) or sub-s. (2) shall be entertained except with the leave of the High Court;

(4) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court;

(5) No application under sub-s. (4) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of six months, where the complainant is a public servant, and sixty days in every other case, computed from the date of that oder of acquittal;

(6) If, in any case, the application under sub-s. (4) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal is refused, no appeal from that order of acquittal shall lie under sub-s. (1) or under sub-section (2)”

After the amendment the provisions read thus:-

“378(1) Appeal in case of acquittal:- (1) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2), and subject to the provisions of sub-ss. (3) and (5):-

(a) the District Magistrate may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the Court of Sessions from an order of Acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of a cognisable and non-bailable offence;

(b) the State Government may, in any case, direct the public prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of an acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court (not being an order u/cl. (a)] or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of Session in revision.”

In Criminal Appeal No.294 of 1996 the order of acquittal dated 22nd December 1995 delivered by learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 5th Court, Dadar, acquitting the respondents from offences punishable under section 452, 454, 457, 427, 341, 380 read with s. 114 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 has been challenged. This appeal has been filed in this Court by the State. The appeal came to be admitted on 18th September 1996 and was placed before Hon’ble Mr.Justice Oka, for hearing and final disposal. When both views were placed before the learned Single Judge, he noticed the conflict and while expressing his opinion that the amended provisions will not apply to appeals against acquittal or applications for leave to file an appeal u/s. 378(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 pending in this Court prior to 23rd June 2006, he formulated the above question and made the order of reference.

Somewhat identical is the situation with regard to the appeals which have been listed along with Criminal Application No.294 of 1996 and that is how we have heard the Counsel appearing for the State and the Accused on this question of law in other appeals.

It is not necessary to refer to the facts in each individual cases inasmuch as all these appeals are directed against acquittals recorded by the subordinate courts.

The controversy is with regard to the orders of the learned Magistrate questioned in these appeals, passed prior to 23rd June 2006, and challenged before this Court by seeking necessary leave under then applicable provisions and whether this Court can dispose off such appeals finally. Prior to this amendment, s. 378 provided for an appeal by the State Government against an order of acquittal passed by the original or the Appellate Forum. However, the State Government had a discretion to direct the Public Prosecutor to present such an appeal to the High Court. The Appeal was to be filed only to this Court against an order of Acquittal passed by any Court other than this Court. Further, an appeal against the acquittal recorded by a Court of Sessions in Revision would also to lie in this Court, subject however to compliance with the relevant statutory conditions.

Therefore, the only forum where an acquittal recorded by a Court of Judicial or Metropolitan Magistrate could have been questioned was either by filing a Revision before the Court of Sessions or an Appeal to this Court. Now, the difference is that in cases where an order of Acquittal is passed by a Magistrate in respect of cognisable and non bailable offences, then, the Dist.Magistrate has a discretion to direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the Court of Sessions, from such an order and State Government has been empowered with equal discretion to direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from a original or appellate order of an acquittal made by any Court other than High Court, save and except that of a Magistrate as provided in S. 378(1)(a) of the Amended Act. The other provision enabling the State Government to direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal from an order of acquittal passed by a Court of Sessions in Revision is in tact. The net result of the Amended provisions is that now an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of a cognisable and non bailable offence can be questioned only by presenting an Appeal to the Court of Sessions and no appeal in that behalf can be filed in this Court.

The statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Act 2005 insofar as insertion of this provision is concerned state that in order to guard against arbitrary exercise of power and to reduce reckless acquittals, s. 378 is being amended to provide for an appeal against the acquittal passed by the Magistrate in cognisable and non bailable offence filed on a police report. We are not really concerned in these matters with the aims, objects and purpose of the Amendment Act in general. Suffice it to observe that the Legislature has now provided for remedies to the State Government to question in appeal, an acquittal by a Magistrate, in the Court of sessions and as far as the original or appellate order passed by any court other than High Court or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of sessions in Revision, same can be questioned by presenting an Appeal in the High Court. Two forums are provided so that one Court alone is not burdened with appeals against acquittals or in any event, the Highest Court in the State need not be approached if the orders of acquittal can be questioned in a Court superior to that of Magistrate viz., the Sessions Court. The question before us really is whether such provision can apply to appeals which are already entertained by this Court and pending for final determination or whether such appeals should also be heard and decided by the Forums provided in the Amendment Act. In other words, whether the Amendment Act would apply to proceedings pending in this Court or not. The view taken by another learned Single Judge of this Court (Hon’ble Mr.Justice V.M.Kanade) is that the amended provisions would apply also to pending applications in this Court seeking leave to challenge the order of acquittal. In the view of Learned Single Judge (Kanade, J) in addition to the pending appeals, even such an application must now be dealt with by the forums provided in the Amendment Act. The correctness of this view is questioned before us.

In all fairness, it must be stated that all the learned Counsel appearing before us, including the learned Additional P.P. did not support this view. However, they endeavoured to place before us the relevant statutory principles of interpretation in support of both views. Mr.Gupte, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the accused in some of the appeals contended that the Appeal against acquittal is also a right vested in the applicants/ appellants. Such right conferred by a Statute also takes within its fold the right of presentation of the appeal to a forum provided by law. According to him, the matter should not be viewed from the limited angle of change of procedure. This is not a procedural change but a substantive one and, therefore, cannot affect the pending proceedings. The pending proceedings must be dealt with under the law as was prevailing on the date of their institution. He submits that in this case, the provisions read as a whole would indicate that the change brought about by the Amended Act affects vested rights and, therefore, this is not a case of mere procedure being altered. The change of forum, according to Mr.Gupte is not necessarily a procedural change. Mr.Gupte has placed before us the decision of the Division Bench of this Court reported in 2004 (1) Mh.L.J. 1046 (Securities & Exchange Board of India Vs. Sterlite Industries (India) and Anr.) and also decisions of the Supreme Court relied upon by the Division Bench.

The Supreme Court decision in the case of New India Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Shanti Misra, reported in 1975 (2) S.C.C. 840 has been referred to by the Division Bench but upon a closer look, it appears to us that the Supreme Court in that decision was concerned with determination of a question of law, viz., whether an application for compensation filed under section 110A of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 arising out of an accident which occurred more than 60 days before the Constitution of Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal could be entertained by the Tribunal or the remedy of the aggrieved person was to institute a civil suit. There the insurance company contended before the Tribunal that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the application and that objection was over-ruled. The insurance company filed a writ petition in the High Court which was allowed by the learned Single Judge. In Appeal by the respondent claimant, there was a difference of opinion between two Judges constituting the Division Bench. A reference was made to a third Judge who held that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain the application. The insurance company took up the matter in further appeal to the Supreme Court and that is how the Supreme Court was concerned with the above question.

After referring to the relevant statutory provisions, that the following observations in paras 5 and 6 have been made:-“5. On the plain language of Sections 110A and 110F there should be no difficulty in taking the view that the change in law was merely a change of forum i.e. a change of adjectival or procedural law and not of substantive law. It is a well established proposition that such a change of law operates retrospectively and the person has to go to the new forum even if his cause of action or right of action accrued prior to the change of forum. He will have a vested right of action but not a vested right of forum. If by express words the new forum is made available only to causes of action arising after the creation of the forum, then the retrospective operation of the law is taken away. Otherwise, the general rule is to make it retrospective. The expressions “arising out of an accident” occurring in sub-s. (1) and “over the area in which the accident occurred”, mentioned in sub-s. (2) clearly show that the change of forum was meant to be operative retrospectively irrespective of the fact as to when the accident occurred. To that extent there was no difficulty in giving the answer in a simple way. But the provision of limitation of 60 days contained in sub-s. (3) created an obstacle in the straight application of the well established principle of law. If the accident had occurred within 60 days prior to the constitution of the Tribunal then the bar of limitation provided in sub-s. (3) was not an impediment. An application to the tribunal could be said to be the only remedy. If such an application, due to one reason or the other, could not be made within 60 days then the Tribunal had the power to condone the delay under the proviso. But if the accident occurred more than 60 days before the constitution of the Tribunal then the bar of limitation provided in sub-s. (3) of Section 110A on its face was attracted. This difficulty of limitation led most of the High Courts to fall back upon the proviso and say that such a case will be a fit one where the Tribunal could be able to condone the delay under the proviso and say that such a case will be a fit one where the tribunal would be able to condone the delay under the proviso to subs. (3) and led others to say that the tribunal will have no jurisdiction to entertain such an application and the remedy of going to the civil court in such a situation was not barred under section 110F of the Act. While taking the latter view the High Court failed to notice that primarily the law engrafted in sections 110A and 110F was a law relating to the change of forum.”

“6. In our opinion in view of the clear and unambiguous language of Sections 110A and 110F it is not reasonable and proper to allow the law of change of forum give way to the bar of limitation provided in sub-s. (3) of Section 110A. It must be vice versa. The change of the procedural law of forum must be given effect to. The underlying principle of the change of law brought about by the amendment in the year 1956 was to enable the claimants to have a cheap remedy of approaching the claims tribunal on payment of a nominal court fee whereas a large amount of ad valorem court fee was required to be paid in civil court. It is legitimate to think that the Legislature did not think it necessary to affect the pending suits but wanted the cheap remedy to be available as soon as the Tribunal was constituted by the State Governments, in all cases irrespective of the date of the accident, provided the remedy of going to the Court was not barred on the date of the constitution of the Tribunal. Then, how is the difficulty of limitation in such cases to be solved is the question.”

Therefore, holding that the jurisdiction of the civil court was ousted as soon as the Claim Tribunal is instituted and remedy of the respondent was to approach that Tribunal alone and inconsonance therewith holding that the said provisions have retrospective operation, that the Supreme Court dismissed the said appeal.

The other decision that has been relied upon by Mr.Gupte is reported in 1979 (1) S.C.C. 92 (Maria Christina Soder and Ors. Vs.Amria Pinto and Ors.). There, the specific issue before the Supreme Court was regarding the period of limitation applicable in Union Territory of Goa, Diu and Daman (as it was then known as) to proceedings launched therein prior to and pending on the date of Liberation of the State of Goa. The facts before the Supreme Court were that the first respondent and her husband (respondent No.2) filed a suit against the appellants before the Supreme Court so also other respondents. That suit was filed in the Court of Madgaon, alleging that in the partition effected in January 1941, certain items of properties had not been valued by the appellants as a result of which they suffered loss.

The trial court decreed the suit and the counter claim. An appeal was preferred in the Court of Judicial Commissioner at Goa and contending that the appeal was not filed in the proper court and that it was barred by limitation, certain provisions of Portuguese Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 were relied upon whereas the other admitted position with regard to Liberation of State of Goa, it becoming part of Union of India with effect from 20th December 1961, Limitation Act, 1963 becoming applicable to whole of India including Union Territory of Goa was noticed. Lastly, the Extension Act whereunder the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908were extended to the Union Territories was relied upon. For all these reasons, it was contended that the appeal should have been filed in the Court of Judicial Commissioner. On the factual findings that are referred to in the Supreme Court decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court made the observations which have been relied upon in the referring order of Justice Oka as well.

We thought it fit to refer to the above cited judgements of the Supreme Court in detail because reliance upon them to support the plea that the Amendment Act cannot have any effect on the pending proceedings, is not completely accurate. The Supreme Court in these decisions observed that the forum where appeal can be lodged is a procedural matter and, therefore, the appeal will have to be lodged in a forum provided for by the Repealing Act, 1870. These decisions and the observations therein, with respect, do not totally assist in resolving the controversy before us.

In our view, the issue is not just of Retrospective operation of S. 378 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Amendment Act, but, whether the High Court loses its jurisdiction even in proceedings entertained by it. In other words, the view taken by Hon’ble Justice Kanade is that this Court cannot hear any applications for leave to appeal nor can it dispose of the pending proceedings by final judgement because of the Amendment to s. 378 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

On the other hand, by relying upon the settled principle that All Laws that affect substantive rights generally operate prospectively and there is presumption against their restrospectivity, if they affect vested rights and obligations, and pressing it into service, it is urged that insofar as applications for leave to appeal are concerned, if the appeal against acquittal is filed on or after 23rd June 2006 against the orders covered by s. 378(1)(a), the same will have to be filed in the Court of Sessions. This is one view whereas the other is to the contrary. In other words, the contrary view is that even if the order of acquittal passed before 23rd June 2006 is questioned, then, the appeals against the acquittal and even leave to file appeal will have to go before the forum provided in the Amendment Act. If the view of Hon’ble Mr.Justice Oka is accepted, of necessity, all the applications which question the orders of acquittal passed prior to 23rd June 2006 will be maintainable before this Court and can be disposed of, provided they are filed prior to the date of Amendment Act coming into force. In other words, in Waidande’s case (supra), the order of Acquittal was passed on 12th April 2005 but the application seeking leave to file appeal was filed in this Court on 2nd August 2006. Learned Judge returned this application for presentation to proper court in the light of the Amended Act because it was filed after 23rd June 2006.

For proper appreciation of this aspect, it would be necessary to refer to some relevant principles of Statutory interpretation, which too are equally well settled.

In “Principles of Statutory Interpretation” (11th Edn.) 2008 by Hon’ble Justice G.P.Singh, former Chief Justice of M.P.High Court, the following principles have been deduced:-

“A new law bringing about a change in forum does not affect pending actions, unless a provision is made in it for change over of proceedings or there is some other clear indication that pending actions are affected. Thus, if the new law which is enacted during the pendency of a suit in a civil court is worded in the form that “no civil court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with” certain questions which are committed to the jurisdiction of Revenue Courts and the pending suit relates to these questions, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would be ousted.”

“The principle, that pending proceedings are not affected, does not go beyond this that in every case language of the Statute has to be examined to determine whether the Legislature clearly intended to bring within reach of of the statute even pending proceedings.”

Thus, the real issue in each case is the scope of the particular enactment having regard to its language and the object as discernible from the Statute read as a whole. In A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 3199 (Commissioner of Income Tax Bangalore Vs. Smt.R.Sharaddamma), the question before the Supreme Court was whether by virtue of deletion of S. 274(2) by Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act 1970, the proceedings pending before the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, would be maintainable or not or must be governed by the Amendment Act. In that context relying upon its earlier decision in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Dhadi Sahu, reported in 1993 (199 ITR) 610, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sharaddamma’s case has observed thus:-

“7. The High Court answered the question in favour of the assessee whereupon the matter was brought to this Court. This Court at the outset stated the general principle applicable in this behalf in the following words:-

“It may be stated at the outset the general principle is that a law which brings about a change in the forum does not affect pending actions unless an intention to the contrary is clearly shown. One of the modes by which such an intention is shown is by making a provision for change over of proceedings from the Court or the Tribunal where they are pending to the court or the tribunal which, under the new law, gets jurisdiction to try them.”

“8. The Court then observed that once a reference was validly made to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner he did not lose the jurisdiction to deal with the matter on account of the aforesaid Amendment Act. It pointed out that the Amending Act does not contain any provision that the references validly pending before the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner should be returned without passing any final order if the amount of income in respect of which the particulars have been concealed did not exceed Rupees Twenty Five thousand. The said circumstances, it held, supported the inference drawn by the Court that the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner continued to have jurisdiction to impose penalty. The Court observed:-

“It is also true that no litigant has any vested right in the matter of procedural law but, where, the question is of change of forum, it ceases to be a question of procedure only. The forum of appeal or proceedings is a vested right as opposed to pure procedure to be followed before a particular forum. The right becomes vested when the proceedings are initiated in the Tribunal or the Court of first instance and, unless the Legislature has, by express words or by necessary implication, clearly so indicated, that vested right will continue in spite of the change of jurisdiction of the different Tribunals or forums.”

“9. This Court pointed out that the view taken by it is also the view taken by Gujarat, Patna, Punjab and Haryana, Bombay, Calcutta and Madhya Pradesh High Courts, whereas Allahabad and Karnataka High Courts had taken a contrary view. The Court disapproved the contrary view taken by the Allahabad and Karnataka High Courts and approved the view taken by the other High Courts.

“10. In our opinion, the principle underlying the said decision is squarely applicable herein. In this case also, a reference was made to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner in accordance with the law in force on the date of reference. Once the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner was thus seized of the matter, he did not lose seizin thereof on account of the deletion of sub-s. (2) of Section 274. This is also the principle underlying S. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.

“11. We may also mention that in Dhadi Sahu, this Court referred inter alia to the earlier decision of this Court in Manujendra Dutt Vs. Purendu Prosad Roy Chaowdhury, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1419, which too was a case of deletion of S. 29 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 by the Amendment Act of 1953. It was held by this Court that by virtue of the said deletion, the Controller, before whom the proceeding was pending, was not deprived of the jurisdiction to try the matter pending before him on the date of coming into force of the Amending Act.”

Thus, there appears to be a slight departure from the earlier view of the Supreme Court itself with regard to change of forum. It has been held that where the question is of change of forum it is not merely a matter of procedure.

This decision of the Supreme Court and the principle culled out therein has been applied in subsequent decisions reported in A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 565. (R.Kapilnath (Dead) through L.Rs. Vs. Krishna)

“4 …… So far as the present case is concerned, the only submission made by the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the effect of the amendment is to deprive the Court of Munsif of its jurisdiction to hear and decide proceedings for eviction over such premises as the suit premises are. In other words, it is a change in forum brought during the pendency of the proceedings. The correct approach to be adopted in such cases is that a new law bringing about a change in forum does not affect pending actions, unless a provision is made in it for change over of proceedings or there is some other clear indication that pending actions are affected. (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Justice G .P.Singh, 8 t h Edition, 2001, P.442) ….”

Therefore, the question before us is not as much of a change of procedure but the High Court losing its jurisdiction to dispose of appeals already entertained and pending before it. In other words, there must be something in the Amendment Act which takes away the jurisdiction of the Highest Court in the State to hear and finally dispose of the pending appeals. From a reading of the provisions, both amended and unamended, we are of the view that there is nothing in it by which one can conclude that the High Court’s jurisdiction is taken away in that behalf. On the other hand, if the Legislature intended to deprive the Highest Court of the State to even dispose of pending proceedings then, it would have made a clear provision in that behalf. Absence of a saving clause by itself would not indicate that the Amendment in this case would apply to pending proceedings as well. Something more in the substantive provisions itself was necessary to deprive this Court of its jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the pending appeals. There being nothing in the amending act to this effect, then, we are of the view that the law laid down in the Supreme Court decision in Sharaddamma’s case (supra) would squarely apply. Therefore, when an appeal was rightly filed and entertained by this Court in accordance with law in force on the date of its institution and when this Court is seized of the matter, it does not lose jurisdiction merely because s. 378 is now amended.

There is enough indication to this effect in the provisions in question itself. The words in sub-cls. (a) and (b) in s. 378(1) “may, in any case direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the court of sessions” so also the words “direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court” and retention of “s. 378(3) and (4)” would indicate that the Legislature did not intend to deprive this Court of its jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the pending appeals questioning the orders of acquittal delivered by a Court subordinate to it in the State. Any other construction of the Amended provision would, in our view, defeat the object and purpose of providing for an appeal against acquittal. The proviso to s. 372 inserted by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Amendment) Act, 208 would also be of assistance in arriving at the view that we have taken.

In the above circumstances, we are of the opinion that the judgement of Hon’ble Mr.Justice Kanade in Criminal Application No.773 of 2006 with Criminal Appeal No.230 of 2006, with respect, does not lay down the correct Law. With deepest respect to him, it appears to us that the difference between the views of the Supreme Court with regard to alteration or change in the provisions regarding forum of appeals has not been brought to His Lordship’s notice. Secondly, the view now taken that whenever there is a change of forum insofar as appeal is concerned, even that is a vested right, was not noticed by His Lordship. This being the case we are of the view that the judgement delivered by His Lordship Oka, J. in Vaidande’s case (Supra), with respect, lays down the correct law.

In the result, the Reference is answered as under:-

(a) S. 378(1) as amended by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Amendment) Act 2005 will not apply to appeals duly filed and entertained prior to the date of the Amendment Act coming into force i.e. 23rd June 2006.

(b) Therefore, all appeals against acquittals filed and entertained prior to 23rd June 2006 can be heard and disposed of by this Court;

(c) All applications seeking leave to file an appeal against the order of acquittal, passed prior to 23rd June 2006 by the Magistrate in respect of cognisable and non-bailable offences can also be heard and disposed of by this Court provided such Applications are duly filed prior to 23rd June 2006;

(d) All pending applications and appeals be placed before the appropriate courts as per Roster for disposal in accordance with law.

(e) Reference is answered accordingly.